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The Role of the United States Army Corps
Of Engineers in Land Use Control
HARRY A. JACKSON, JR.*
Since July 25, 1975,1 nationally, and since January, 1972 in the
San Francisco Bay Area2 the Army Corps of Engineers (the
"Corps") has asserted regulatory authority over lands and
"waters"8 having no connection with navigation.
For the uninitiated, some explanation of the Corps' role in pro-
tecting the navigable waters of the United States is necessary.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
In response to such cases as Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v.
Hatch,4 Congress first passed the Act of September 19, 1890 pro-
A.B. Dartmouth College, 1953; LL.B., Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, 1956.
Private Practice in San Francisco and Of Counsel for Landels, Ripley &
Diamond, San Francisco.
1. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120 (1975).
2. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINERS, PUBLIC NoTICE 71-22(a) (January 18,
1972).
This is an elaboration of our previous Public Notice No. 71-22,
dated 11 June 1971, announcing that the Corps of Engineers is
now exercising its regulatory authorities within the area bound
by the plane of mean of the higher high water. Permits are re-
quired for all new work in unfilled portions of the interior of
diked areas below former mean higher high water.
3. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), § 1362(7) (1972).
4. Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 123 U.S. 1 (1888). The court
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hibiting the creation of any obstruction to the navigable capacity
of waters under United States jurisdiction without affirmative
legal authorization.
In 1899, Congress enacted a new Section 10 as part of the Rivers
and Harbors Appropriation Act 5 which has remained unchanged
since that time. Section 10 provides in relevant part:
... and it shall not be lawful to excavate or fill, or in any
manner to alter or modify the course, location, condition, or
capacity of, any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, lake, harbor
of refuge, or inclosure within the limits of any breakwater, or
of the channel of any navigable water of the United States unless
the work has been recommended by the Chief of Engineers and
authorized by the Secretary of the Army prior to beginning the
same. 6
The concept of "navigable waters" has been the subject of con-
siderable judicial imagination over the years, the courts extending
the concept from interstate rivers used for commercial travel and
shipping7 to non-navigable mosquito infested canals and mangrove
wetlands above the mean high tide line."
held that Congress had unquestionable power to regulate the navigation of
public rivers and to prevent their obstruction. However, until Congress
does act to that end, there is no common law which prohibits obstructions
and nuisances in the river, except, perhaps maritime law as administered
by the courts of admiralty.
5. Ch. 425, § 10, 30 Stat. 1151 (1899).
6. Rivers and Harbor Appropriation Act, ch. 425, § 10, 30 Stat. 1151
'(1899).
7. The Daniel Bell, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1871).
A different test must, therefore, be applied to determine the navigability
of our rivers and that is found in their navigable capacity. Those rivers
must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable
in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are sus-
ceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for com-
merce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the custom-
ary modes of trade and travel on water. And they constitute navigable
waters of the United States within the meaning of the Acts of Congress,
in contradistinction from the navigable waters of the States, when they
form in their ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with other
waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or may be carried
on with other States or foreign countries in the customary modes in which
such commerce is conducted by water. Id. at 563.
8. United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974). As a
matter of historical interest the range of definitions evolved over the period
of a century. See, e.g., The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430 (1874) which
expanded the definition to include waters that were capable of commercial
use as well as those in actual use; Economy Light and Power Co. v. United
Today, the Corps follows its own definition of navigability as
contained in its own regulations:
(h) Time at which commerce exists or determination is made
-M(1) Past use. A water body which was navigable in its nat-
ural or improved state, or which was susceptible of reasonable
improvement (as discussed in paragraph (g) (2)9 of this section)
retains its character as 'navigable in law' even though it is not
presently used for commerce, or is presently incapable of such use
because of changed conditions or the presence of obstructions.
Nor does absence of use because of changed economic conditions
affect the legal character of the water body. Once having attained
the character of 'navigable in law', the Federal authority remains
in existence, and cannot be abandoned by administrative officers
or court action. Nor is mere inattention or ambiguous action by
Congress an abandonment of Federal control. However, express
statutory declarations by Congress that described portions of a
water body are nonnavigable, or have been abandoned, are bind-
ing upon the Department of the Army. Each statute must be
carefully examined, since Congress often reserves the power to
amend the Act, or assigns special duties of supervision and control
to the Secretary of the Army or Chief of Engineers.
(2) Future or potential use. Navigability may also be found
in a water body's susceptibility for future use for purposes of
interstate commerce. This may be either in its natural or im-
proved condition, and may thus be existent although there has
been no actual use to date. Nonuse in the past therefore does not
prevent recognition of the potential for future use.
(i) Existence of obstructions. A stream may be navigable de-
spite the existence of falls, rapids, sand bars, bridges, portages,
States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921) which held that, despite obstructions and physi-
cal changes such as dams and bridges, a continuous stretch of water (Des-
plaines River) remained navigable in law because in its last natural state
it had been used historically as a means of commercial transport; and
United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940) in
which a stretch of river (the New River, a watercourse following between
Virginia and West Virginia) was declared to be navigable because of its
past use for commerce and its suitability for such use in the future by mak-
ing "reasonable improvements".
9. 33 C.F.R. § 209.260(n) (g) (2) (1975). This legislation deals with
nonexisting improvements, past and potential. A water body may also be
considered navigable depending on the feasibility of future use for interstate
commerce after the construction of whatever "reasonable" improvements
may potentially be made. The improvements need not exist, be planned,
nor even authorized; it is enough that potentially they could be made.
What is a "reasonable" improvement is always a matter of degree; there
must be a balance between cost and need at the time when the improve-
ment would be (or would have been) useful. Thus, if an improvement was
"reasonable" at a time of past use, the water therefore became navigable
as a matter of law from that time forward. The changes in engineeering
practices or the coming of new industries with varying classes of freight
may affect the type of the improvement; those which may be entirely rea-
sonable in at hickly populated, highly developed, industrial region may
have been entirely too costly for the same region in the days of the pioneers.
The determination of what constitutes a reasonable improvement is often
similar to the cost analyses presently made in Corps of Engineers studies.
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shifting currents, or similar obstructions. Thus, a waterway in
its original condition might have had substantial obstructions
which were overcome by frontier boats and/or portages, and
nevertheless be a 'channel' for commerce, even though boats had
to be removed from the water in some stretches, or logs be
brought around an obstruction by means of artificial chutes.
However, the question is ultimately a matter of degree, and it
must be recognized that there is some point beyond which nav-
igability could not be established.10
The Corps defines its jurisdiction in coastal areas as follows:
(k) Geographic and jurisdictional limits of oceanic and tidal
waters-(1) Ocean and coastal waters. The navigable waters of
the United States over which Corps of Engineers regulatory juris-
diction extends include all ocean and coastal waters within a zone
3 geographic (nautical) miles seaward from the coast line. Wider
zones are recognized for special regulatory powers, such as those
exercised over the Outer Continental Shelf.
(i) Coast line defined. Generally, where the shore directly
contacts the open sea, the line on the shore reached by the ordi-
nary low tides comprises the coast line from which the distance of
3 geographic miles is measured. On the Pacific coasts the line of
mean lower low water is used. The line has significance for both
domestic and international law (in which it is termed the 'base-
line'), and is subject to precise definitions. Special problems
arise when offshore rocks, islands, or other bodies exist, and the
line may have to be drawn to seaward of such bodies.
(ii) Shoreward limit of jurisdiction. Regulatory jurisdiction
in coastal areas extends to the line on the shore reached by the
plane of the mean (average) high water. However, on the
Pacific coasts the line reached by the mean of the higher high
waters is used.
Where precise determination of the actual location of the line
becomes necessary, it must be established by survey with refer-
ence to the available tidal datum, preferably averaged over a
period of 18.6 years. Less precise methods, such as the observa-
tion of the 'apparent shoreline' which is determined by reference
to physical markings, lines of vegetation, or changes in type of
vegetation, may be used only where an estimate is needed of the
line reached by the mean high water.
(2) Bays and estuaries. Regulatory jurisdiction extends to the
entire surface and bed of all water bodies subject to tidal action.
Jurisdiction thus extends to the edge (as determined by para-
graph (k) (1) (ii) of this section, 'Shoreward Limit') of all such
water bodies, even though portions of the water body may be
extremely shallow, or obstructed by shoals, vegetation, or other
barriers. Marshlands and similar areas are thus considered 'nav-
igable in law', but only so far as the area is subject to innundation
10. 33 C.F.R. § 209.260(h) (1975).
by the mean high waters. The relevant test is therefore the
presence of the mean high tidal waters, and not the general test
described above, which generally applies to inland rivers and
lakes."
If the location of the shoreline shifts due to "natural causes" the
"boundaries of the navigable water" are likewise altered. If the
change in location is due to artificial forces "intended to produce
that change" (presumably diking and filling), the filled area re-
mains "navigable in law" under the regulations. 12
These latter two subsections have produced one of the most per-
plexiing questions yet to arise in the long history of the United
States law of navigable waters. If a marsh adjacent to a bay or
estuary was diked off from tidal influence or filled at a time when
the Corps required no permit for such activities, 13 does the area
11. 33 C.F.R. § 209.260(k) (1975).
12. 33 C.F.R. § 209.260(e) (1975). This section concerns geographic
limits in terms of shifting boundaries.
Permanent changes of the shoreline configuration result in sim-
ilar alterations of the boundaries of the navigable water. Thus,
gradual changes which are due to natural causes and are percep-
tible only over some period of time constitute changes in the bed
of a water body which also change the shoreline boundaries of
the navigable waters. However, an area will remain "navigable
in law," even though no longer covered with water, whenever the
change has occurred suddenly, or was caused by artificial forces
intended to produce that change. For example, shifting sand bars
within a river or estuary remain part of the navigable water,
regardless that they may be dry at a particular point in time.
13. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(g) (12) (vii) (1975) provides as follows:
Applications will generally not be required for work or struc-
tures completed before 18 December 1968, nor where potential
applicants had received expressions of disclaimer prior to the date
of this regulation; provided, however, that the procedures of
paragraph (g) (12) (i) of this section shall apply to all work or
structures which were commenced or completed on or after 18
December 1968, and may be applied to all specific cases, regard-
less of date of construction or previous disclaimers, for which the
District Engineer determines that the interests of navigation so
require.
The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-66(c) (1958) re-
quired the Corps to consult with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
(then the Bureau of Sports, Fisheries and Wildlife) regarding the impact
on aquatic life of a proposed permit to impound, divert, modify or control
the water of any stream (except for impoundments of less than 10 acres.
This requirement is rarely, if ever, mentioned in the decisions or by the
environmental law writers).
On July 13, 1967, a Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretary
of the Interior and the Secretary of the Army was entered into pledging
Corps cooperation with the Interior on the fish and wildlife aspects of pro-
posed dredging, filling and excavation activities subject to corps permits.
See 33 C.F.R. § 209.120 (app. B) (1975).
In 1969 the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-47
(1969) was enacted requiring an Environmental Impact Statement for every
[VOL. 3: -S86, 1976] Land Use Control
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remain "navigable in law" and thus subject to the elaborate permit
requirements of the Corps? What if the proposed "filling" activity
behind these dikes is on "fast land" or involves no navigable
waters? 1
4
major federal action that may significantly affect the quality of the human
environment.
In 1970 the Corps was chided by a subcommittee of the House (H.R. REP.
No. 917, 91st CONG., 2d SEss. (1970)) for failing to assess the environmental
impact of applications for permits to fill, dredge, or construct works in navi-
gable waters.
On October 18, 1972, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344 (1972) was amended to provide that permits for the discharge of
dredged or fill material into the United States' navigable waters must be
consistent with EPA guidelines and are subject to denial by the EPA on
environmental grounds.
14. On March 11, 1976, a Memorandum of Decision by Sweigert, District
Judge (N.D. Cal.) in the cases of Sierra Club v. Leslie Salt Company, No.
72, 561 WTS and Leslie Salt Company v. Froehlke, No. 73, 2294 WTS was
filed. Judge Sweigert attempted to address these questions by relying upon
Economy Light Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921), see Note 6, supra,
to "moderate" the effect of United States v. Stoeco Homes, 498 F.2d 597
(3rd Cir. 1974), discussed infra. Judge Sweigert holds as follows:
The rules of Stoeco and Economy are consistent in that under
Economy the body of water in question remains navigable in law
so long as the artifical obstruction is capable of being abated by
due exercise of the public authority, whereas Stoeco holds, in
effect, that the area in question ceases to be navigable in law only
if the artificial obstruction has become fast land-i.e., improved
solid upland.
The property here in question is not improved solid upland.
It is instead unfilled Bay bottom, much if not all of it below the
level of MHHW, and much of it still subject to periodic inundation
by Ba water for the production of salt, but not now subject to
the eb and flow of the tide (though the latter point is disputed
in No. 72-561). The property is such that, if the dikes were
broken, it would return to its former natural condition of daily
tidal inundation without the removal of any fill or other improve-
ments. The dikes herein are, in short, much more closely akin to
artificial obstructions capable of being abated by due exercise of
the public authority as in Economy, than they are to the improved
solid upland supporting streets and houses considered in Stoeco.
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the diked areas here
in question, which lie within the former line of MHHW in its
unobstructed, natural state, are still within the jurisdiction of the
Corps of Engineers under both the FWPCA and the Rivers and
Harbors Act. Consequently, these areas are subject to regulation
by the Corps pursuant both to the Rivers and Harbors Act as indi-
cated in the Corps' Public Announcements 71-22 and 71-22(a),
and to the FWPCA.
The case is unique also because it is the first to hold that the Corps of
Engineers has a navigational servitude up to the "plane of mean higher
high water on the Pacific Coast". In shallow tidal planes this additional
area could involve several miles of coastal frontage. It is interesting to
As the Corps evolved its environmental awareness it also grad-
ually expanded its territorial imperative to embrace areas long since
removed from (if ever considered within) the scope of the federal
navigational servitude. The land use controls contained within
the Corps regulatory framework impose a significant constraint
upon lands which are considered subject to those regulations. It is,
therefore, the purpose of this paper to discuss some of the ques-
tions relative to the determination of when federal jurisdiction
attaches and what the land use consequences of such jurisdiction
are.
I. THE FEDERAL NAVIGATIONAL SERVITUDE
As stated in Gilman v. City of Philadelphia: 15
The power to regulate commerce 16 comprehends the control, for
that purpose and to the extent necessary, of all navigable waters
of the United States . . . . For this purpose they are the public
property of the nation, and subject to all the requisite legislation
by Congress. 17
This power confers upon the United States a navigational servi-
tude which extends up to, but not beyond, the ordinary high
water mark.'8
The ordinary high water mark limit to the servitude is appar-
ently recognized by the Corps in relation to rivers and lakes 9 and
in relation to the marshlands of bays and estuaries 20 but not with
respect to the shoreward limit of coastal waters on the Pacific
Coast where the test is "the mean of the higher high waters.
'21
note that the "dikes in question" had been erected between 20 and 50 years
before the Corps changed its policy.
15. Gilman v. City of Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, (1865).
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
17. Gilman, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 724-5.
18. United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967) wherein it was held that
when the United States condemns riparian land it is not required to pay
compensation for the value of the land as a port site; see also, South Caro-
lina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4 (1876); Federal Power Commission v. Niagara
Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239 (1954).
19. 33 C.F.R. § 209.260(j) (1975).
Geographic and jurisdictional limits of rivers and lakes
(1) Jurisdiction over entire bed. Federal regulatory jurisdiction,
and powers of improvement for navigation, extend laterally
to the entire water surface and bed of a navigable water body,
which includes all the land and waters below the ordinary high
water mark.
20. 33 C.F.R. § 209.260(k) (2) (1975).
21. See supra note 2 which relates to San Francisco Bay and, thus, ap-
pears at variance with the distinction between ocean waters and bays and
estuaries and the marshlands thereof set forth in 33 C.F.R. § 209.260(k) (2)
(1975). See also note 37 infra.
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No explanation for the distinction between Pacific Ocean marsh-
lands and "coastal" waters is given by the Corps, so one is left to
speculate on the rationale. One theory is that the coastal waters
have traditionally had more national significance than the marsh-
lands of bays and estuaries which historically have been the con-
cern of the states.22 Another explanation is that in drafting the
regulations for marshlands of bays and estuaries reference was
made to the coastal water regulations and the Corps deemed it
unnecessary to repeat the "higher" high tide language because in
view of the specific reference the concept is (arguably) embraced
within the more general phrase, "the presence of the mean high
tidal waters."
Efforts by the Corps to assert jurisdiction over marshlands above
the mean high water mark have met with mixed reactions in the
Courts. For example, in United States v. Cannon,23 the court drew
the line, as follows:
Finally the government contends that its regulatory jurisdiction
extends to any area adjacent to navigable water where filling or
excavating activity may 'affect' such waters. This proposition is
troubling if it is intended, as it apparently is, to include an asser-
tion that the licensing requirement of the Rivers and Harbors Act
encompasses any activity on fast land which, while involving no
direct physical intrusion upon navigable waters and no indirect
creation of an impediment or obstruction to navigation, may never-
theless affect the ecology of the adjacent body of water. The ques-
tion, of course, is not whether Congress has the constitutional power
under the commerce clause to subject such activity to regulation;
the question is whether it has done so. The answer accordingly
lies in the Act itself and in an analysis of the particular activities
which are there declared to be subject to regulation.
It is clear that Sections 403 and 407 do reach activities on fast
land the effect of which is 'the creation of . . . [an] obstruction
... to the navigable capacity of any [water] of the United States.'
Moreover, we can accept as correct those cases which hold that
where a permit is required the government may take environ-
mental considerations into account in deciding whether to issue a
permit. It does not necessarily follow, however, that an ecological
impact on navigable water without more is enough to require a
permit under the Rivers and Harbors Act.2 4
22. See, e.g. 43 U.S.C. §§ 981, et seq. (1970), granting swamp and over-
flowed lands to states, particularly California. The conflict between the
navigational servitude in marshland areas and the private rights which have
vested under the swampland grant is discussed.
23. United States v. Cannon, 363 F. Supp. 1045 (D.C. Del. 1973).
24. Id. at 1050-51.
S93
Whereas, in United States v. Holland,23 the court found that the
Corps could assert jurisdiction over mangrove wetlands above the
mean high water line26 to regulate point sources of water pollution
under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.2 7 The Holland
case ignored the question of the extent of the servitude and appar-
ently confused point source pollution control under 33 U.S.C. § 1342
(which is the responsibility of the EPA and the states) with 33
U.S.C. § 1344 which retains Corps permit jurisdiction over the dis-
charge of dredged or fill material in navigable waters.
More recently in Conservation Council of North Carolina v.
Costanza,28 the court held that Corps jurisdiction under § 404 of
the FWPCA extends to coastal salt meadows "periodically inun-
dated" but merely required the violator to obtain an "after the fact"
permit on the ground that the violation was only a "technical" one
"under fast changing, unstable law. '2 9
Cases frequently cited for expanded Corps jurisdiction such
as Zabel v. Tabb,30 and United States v. Lewis,31 do not amount to
judicial endorsement of jurisdiction above the mean high water
mark but stand rather as emphatic authority for the proposition
that the Corps must take environmental consequences into con-
sideration in the permit process.
Can the Corps go beyond the federal navigational servitude to
regulate filling of lands above the ordinary high water mark? That
question was specifically addressed in United States v. Stoeco
Homes.32 That case involved former tidal marsh in New Jersey
which was removed from tidal action and partially filled in 1927
without a Corps permit. The defendant (Stoeco) acquired the
property in 1951 and was in the process of developing the site as a
water oriented residential community. The development involved
dredging channels and filling the adjacent (diked off) area, similar
to many bay front developments in California. The Corps obtained
an injunction in the District Court because Stoeco had no Corps
permit. Stoeco appealed, challenging the Corps assertion of juris-
diction and attacking § 209.260(k) (2). The Court of Appeals
stated:
25. United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665 (D.C. Fla. 1974).
26. Id. at 674.
27. Id. at 675.
28. Conservation Council of N.C. v. Costanza, 528 F.2d 250 (1975).
29. Compare Weiszman v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 526 F.2d 1302
(D.D.C. 1975).
30. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970).
31. United States v. Lewis, 355 F. Supp. 1132 (S.D. Ga. 1973).
32. United States v. Stoeco Homes, 498 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1974).
PEPPERDIME LAW REVIEW
At oral argument the government took the position that even the
occupants of homes on the fully developed part of the Stoeco tract
remained in occupation only so long as the United States as a
matter of grace declined to assert its navigational servitude. This
approach is an oversimplification, for the government did not
establish that the 1927 filling operation was illegal. Section 10
by its plain language contemplates congressional consent to some
encroachments on the navigational servitude, and delegates to the
Army Corps of Engineers and the Secretary of the Army authority
to grant such consent on its behalf. If the administrative agency
gives an express consent by permit in a specific instance, with no
reservation of the right to compel removal, surely that consent
must be considered to be a surrender of the federal servitude over
the fee in question. Section 10 is silent as to the method of giving
consent, but textually a blanket consent with respect to a class of
properties does not appear to be prohibited. The longstanding
administrative practice, at least prior to 1970, was to require con-
sents for encroachments only beyond pierhead or harbor lines. On
the record before us we must assume that this was the administra-
tive practice when in 1927 the premses in question became fast
rather than tidal land. Thus there is no basis for the district court's
conclusion that in 1927 the land was illegally filled. When Stoeco
purchased in 1951 what then had been fast land for twenty four
years the navigational servitude had long since been surrendered.
We reach this conclusion as a matter of statutory interpretation
of § 10, mindful that though the Congerssional power over the
regulation of commerce is far reaching that power is limited by
the due process and taking clauses of the fifth amendment. Cer-
tainly a construction which would, after government inactivity
from 1890 to 1970, cast doubt upon the property status of thou-
sands of acres of former tidal marshes would present problems
under that amendment. Cf. United States v. Pennsylvania In-
dustrial Chemical Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 674, 93 S.Ct. 1804, 36 L.Ed.
2d 567 (1973).
We conclude, therefore, that the broad injunction against any
construction whatsoever in the premises in question cannot be
sustained on the theory that a § 10 permit is required for such
construction. That holding is limited, of course, to tidal marsh-
lands which had become fast land prior to the change in policy
of the Army Corps of Engineers. Any work undertaken in estuar-
ine areas which were subject to the ebb and flow of the tide when
the Army Corps of Engineers published its new regulations assert-
ing the navigational servitude to its full extent, are, under the
terms of these regulations, now subject to the § 10 permit re-
quirement .... 33
The Court, in reaching that decision declared:
The federal environmental protection statutes did not, how-
ever, by their terms enlarge the jurisdiction of the Army Corps
of Engineers under the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of
33. Id. at 610-11.
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1899. If there is no such jurisdiction environmental protection is
still a matter primarily of state concern .... 84
The Court did, however, uphold the Corps' authority to regulate
the discharge of "dredge fines in the waters of South Harbor and
its tributary lagoons" (which are navigable waters).35
The Stoeco case apparently stands alone for the proposition that
the navigational servitude can be extinguished through Corps in-
action or acquiescence. If followed it would appear to restrict
Corps jurisdiction over former marshlands to those areas such as
sloughs which remain open tidal channels or inlets.30
No discussion of the servitude should be considered exhausted
without mention of what appears to be an entirely inconsistent
congressional policy, vital albeit archaic, regarding swamp and
overflowed lands.3 7
Starting in 1850, pursuant to the Swamp Land Act,38 Congress
expressly encouraged the states to reclaim land by constructing the
34. Id. at 607.
35. The Corps did not rely upon the FWPCA but upon 33 U.S.C. § 407
(1975) instead.
36. Such an interpretation would be consistent with § 407 of the FWPCA
which is confined to navigable waters of the United States.
It should be noted that in California such open sloughs, channels or inlets
are deemed subject to the public trust for fisheries, navigation and com-
merce. See, e.g., People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79
(1931); Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 281
(1971); and Taylor, Patented Tidelands: A Naked Fee?, 47 CAL. ST. B. J.,
420 (1972).
The public "easement" can also be lost through estoppel but only under
very special cicrumstances such as existed in City of Long Beach v. Mansell,
3 Cal. 3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1970).
37. 43 U.S.C. §§ 981, et seq. (1970).
38. Act of September 28, 1850, ch. 84, 9 Stat. 520. For an early discus-
sion of the California statutes implementing the Federal Act, see People
v. Morrill, 26 Cal. 336, 355 (1864).
Swamp and overflowed lands historically constituted marshlands lying
above mean high water. Portions lie below mean higher high water. On
the Pacific Coast there are two high waters each day, one being higher than
the other. Mean high water or ordinary high water is the average height
of all high waters over a 18.6 year period. See, Borax Consolidated, Ltd.
v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935). Mean higher high water on
the other hand is the average height of the higher of the two high tides
that occur each day. See, 1 SHALLOWITZ, SHORE AND SEA BOUNDARIES 300(1962). The area between mean high water and mean higher high water
would be included within the definition of swamp and overflowed lands,
for although it is not covered by ordinary high tides, it is subject to periodic
overflow caused by some higher high tides. In areas such as parts of the
shoreline of San Francisco Bay where the tidal plain is very flat, the differ-
ence between the ordinary high water line and the mean of the higher high
tide can be as much as 4 miles.
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necessary levees and drains to reclaim the swamp and overflowed
lands therein.
With respect to these lands the Supreme Court in 1900 had no
difficulty in finding that they were eliminated from the servitude.
Thus, in Leovy v. United States,39 in dismissing a criminal action
against Leovy for damming a stream, the Court stated:
While, therefore, it may not be easy for a court to define the size
and character of a stream which would place it within the cate-
gory of 'navigable waters of the United States', or to define what
traffic shall constitute 'commerce among the states', so as to make
such questions sheer matters of law, yet, in construing the legisla-
tion involved in the case before us, we may be permitted to see
that it was not the intention of Congress to interfere with or pre-
vent the exercise by the state of Louisiana of its power to reclaim
swamp and overflowed lands by regulating and controlling the
current of small streams not used habitually as arteries of inter-
state commerce.40
If Leovy is to be taken seriously, the Corps would have no juris-
diction (derived from the servitude) over former marshlands on
the Pacific Coast patented by the federal government and the states
as swamp and overflowed lands regardless of whether they were
once subject to the mean of the higher high tides.41
It is against this background of interplay between the naviga-
tional servitude and the regulatory schemes which reach beyond it
that the Corps resisted the Natural Resources Defense Council in
NRDC v. Callaway,42 in their attempt to push Corps jurisdiction
39. Leovy v. United States, 177 U.S. 621 (1900).
40. Id. at 632.
41. 33 C.F.R. § 209.260(k) (1975). By definition, lands would not be
eligible for classification as swamp and overflowed land if they were regu-
larly inundated by the mean high tides. Certain meandering sloughs within
the swamps might have, however, been so inundated. Congress in 1850 did
not make such a fine distinction and many such sloughs were included
within swamp and overflowed patents.
42. National Resources Defense Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685
(D.D.C. 1975).
During the final stages of consideration of the Senate and House bills
prior to enactment of the FWPCA, Congress carved out a narrow exception
to the overall NPDES program by creating a new Section 404 which pro-
vided for the exclusive Federal regulation of discharges of dredged or fill
material in navigable waters by the Secretary of the Army, acting through
the Chief of Engineers. No provision was made for the transfer of the Sec-
tion 404 program to the States. The purpose of this Amendment is sum-
marized by Senator Ellender who felt the measure simply retained the au-
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beyond the navigable water in connection with filling activities
supposedly covered by § 404 of the FWPCA.43-
III. THE CORPs MOVES INTO LAND USE
Following Callaway, the Corps' final version of the regulations44
embraces the following:
a. Coastal wetlands, mudflats, swamps and similar areas adja-
cent or contiguous to other navigable waters.
b. Rivers, lakes, streams, and artificial water bodies up to their
headwaters and landward to their ordinary high water mark (in-
undated 25% of the time).
c. All artificially created channels and canals used for recrea-
tional purposes that are connected to other navigable waters.
d. All tributaries of navigable waters up to their headwaters(the point on the stream above which the flow is normally less
than 5 cubic feet per second) and landward to their ordinary high
water mark.
e. Interstate waters.
f. Intrastate lakes, rivers and streams.
g. Freshwater wetlands, including marshes, shallows, swamps
and similar areas that are contiguous to or adjacent to other
navigable waters and that support freshwater vegetation.
h. Those other "waters" needing to be protected under 40 CFR
230.45
thority of the Secretary of the Army which is essential because it is the
responsibility of the Secretary to maintain and improve the "navigable
waters of the United States."
The ensuing Congressional dialogue and Committtee reports pertaining to
Section 494 made it clear that Congress was fully aware of the process by
which dredge and fill permits were handled and that since a system to issue
permits already existed, Congress did not wish to create a burdensome
bureaucracy. The legislative history of Section 404 also revealed a Congres-
sional concern that no unreasonable restrictions emanating from the vigor-
ous water quality programs of the FWPCA be imposed on dredging activi-
ties essential for the maintenance of interstate and foreign commerce. See
generally, 1-2 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, A LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENT OF
1972, 93d Cong., 1st SEss. (1974).
In the Callaway decision Judge Aubrey Robinson may have been con-
fused by the contradictory legislative history of Section 404. Apparently,
in ordering the Corps to expand its regulatory role to reach all "waters",
he adopted the 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1972) definition which states that the
term "navigable waters" means the waters of the United States and includes
the territorial seas.
43. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1975).
44. The Corps first published four alternative regulatory formats in the
Federal Register of May 6, 175, but on July 25, 1975, promulgated their
"interim final regulations" which remain on the books as of January 1976.
45. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d) (2) (1975).
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The discharge of dredged or fill material into these "waters"
requires a Corps permit. The definitions of dredged material and
fill material set forth in the Act in subsection d(5-7) are quite
comprehensive with few exceptions. 46 Under its regulations the
Corps could take the position that the continuation of land filling
on diked off areas (once within the reach of the tides) or the im-
poundment and diversion of storm drainage creeks or ponds within
such diked areas 47 would require a permit unless one can prove
the applicability of the pre-December 18, 1968 grandfather clause.48
The potential sweep of the Corps regulatory authority becomes
apparent in light of the historical retroactivity of the doctrine of
"once navigable in fact, always navigable in law."
IV. WHAT DOES THE PERMIT PROCESS INVOLVE?
The amount of detail involved in a permit application, while
generally covered under § 209.120(h), is a matter which the local
46. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d) (5-7) (1975). Fill material is defined as any
pollutant used to replace an aquatic area with dry land or for altering the
bottom elevation of a body of water. The regulation excluded material re-
sulting from normal operations in farming, silvaculture and ranching and
materials used for the maintenance of water control structures.
47. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(g) (3) (i) (1975) which provides:
(3) Effect on wetlands. (i) Wetlands are those land and
water areas subject to regular inundation by tidal, riverine, or
lacustrine flowage. Generally included are inland and coastal
shallows, marshes, mudflats, estuaries, swamps and similar areas
in coastal and inland navigable waters. Many such areas serve
important purposes relating to fish and wildlife, recreation, and
other elements of the general public interest. As environmentally
vital areas, they constitute a productive and valuable public re-
source, the unnecessary alteration or destruction of which should
be discouraged as contrary to the public interest.
If a residential lot is located in a wetlands area, the Interstate Land Sales
Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq. (1968) would require the I-=D
Report to state that no permit had been granted for the development. See,
33 C.F.R. § 209.120(c) (8) (1975).
48. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(g) (12) (vii) (1975) which provides:
(vii) Applications will generally not be required for work or
structures completed before 18 December 1968, nor where potential
applicants had received expressions of disclaimer prior to the date
of this regulation; provided, however, that the procedures of
paragraph (g) (12) (i) of this section shall apply to all work or
structures which were commenced or completed on or after 18
December 1968, and may be applied to all specific cases, regardless
of date of construction or previous disclaimers, for which the
District Engineer determines that the interests of navigation so
require.
District Engineer's staff will, for the most part, dictate. If a close
question exists with respect to whether the Corps has jurisdiction
over the site or the activity involved, an applicant, wishing to pre-
serve his right to contest the Corps' authority might consider a
"reservation of rights" clause in his permit application.40
When all of the required information has been provided to the
District Engineer, the District Engineer will issue what is called a
"public notice". The contents of the public notice are prescribed. 50
In some districts the District Engineer will provide the applicant
with a draft of the proposed public notice before it is issued in order
to give the applicant an opportunity to make comments and sug-
gested changes.
When the public notice is issued, copies
will be sent to all parties who have specifically requested copies
of public notices, to the U.S. senators and representatives for the
area where the work is to be performed, the field representatives
of the Secretary of the Interior, the regional director of the Bureau
of Sports, Fisheries and Wildlife, the regional director of the
National Park Service, the regional administrator of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, the regional director of the National
Marine Fisheries Service of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, the head of the state agency responsible for fish
and wildlife resources, the district commander, U.S. Coast Guard,
and the office of the Chief of Engineers.5 1
The public notice will usually call for comments to be received
within thirty days52 although this time limit is rarely if ever
enforced and in fact is contradicted by the seventy-five day period
indicated in another section. 3
If the District Engineer determines that an environmental impact
statement is necessary,5 4 the Corps' environmental branch will pre-
pare one. The expense of such statement may be assessed against
the applicant. 55 If a state environmental impact report was pre-
pared in connection with the applicant's proposed project, the Corps'
environmental branch should have the EIR available to assist it in
the preparation of its EIS.
49. A reservation clause could be drafted which states generally that
by filing the application the applicant does not concede either the Corps'
jurisdiction over his property or its authority to regulate the proposed activ-
ity and that the applicant expressly reserves the right to contest assertions
of jurisdiction and authority.
50. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(i) (1) (ii) (1975).
51. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(i) (1) (ii) (1975).
52. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(j) (1) (viii) (1975).
53. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(i) (3) (ii) (1975).
54. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(i)(1)(iv) (1975).
55. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(h) (2) (vi) (1975).
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If a public hearing56 is to be held on the permit application, the
"proposed final environmental impact statement must be com-
pleted prior to the hearing. '5 7
If the proposed activity requires a water quality certification
from the local water quality board or from the EPA, the applica-
tion will not be processed until such certification has either been
obtained or waived. If the certifying agency fails to respond
within three months after a valid request for such certification, the
District Engineer can consider that the requirement of certifica-
tion has been waived.58
If the proposed activity is to be located in the coastal zone of the
state, the District Engineer shall obtain from the applicant a certifi-
cation that the activity conforms to the coastal zone management
program of the state. 59
In evaluating a permit, the District Engineer is authorized to
take into consideration a variety of factors which are essentially
the same kinds of elements involved in the local land use and
planning process. Thus, the regulations provide that the decision
to issue a permit will be based on an evaluation of the probable
impact on the public interest of the proposed activity and its
projected use.6 0
56. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 404(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a)
(1975) requires a public hearing if "waters are being filled." Section 404 (c)
requires the EPA to hold a "hearing" if it intends to "veto" the Corps' per-
mit on environmental grounds.
If purely a Rivers and Harbors Act § 10, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1899) matter,
then a hearing is subject to the discretion of the District Engineer under
33 C.F.R. § 209.120(i) (1) (v) (1975).
Since 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (5) (1975) requires all permit applications for
discharges under old Refuse Act of 1899 to be processed under the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1975), it is likely that
a public hearing will be required in all cases because of the broad defini-
tions of "fill", supra at note 45. The July 25, 1975 regulations make it dif-
ficult to conceive of an activity "purely" within the Rivers and Harbors
Act.
57. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(i) (1) (iv) (1975).
58. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(i) (2) (i) (b) (1975).
59. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(i) (2) (ii) (1975).
60. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(f) (1) (1975) includes the following factors:
(2) The following general criteria will be considered in the
evaluation of every application:
(i) The relative extent of the public and private need for the
proposed structure or work.(ii) The desirability of using appropriate alternative locations
SI0
What weight will the District Engineer give to the fact that the
project has been approved by the local jurisdiction in which it is
situated?
The Regulations provide:
Where officially adopted State, regional or local land-use classi-
fications, determinations or policies are applicable to the land or
water areas under consideration they shall be presumed to reflect
local factors of the public interest and shall be considered in addi-
tion with the other national factors of the public interest identified
in paragraph (f) (1), above.61
However, no state or local endorsement of a project will be
allowed to override "national factors of the public interest," the
EPA guidelines62 or any of the following statutes: the National
Environmental Policy Act,63 the Fish and Wildlife Coordination
Act,64 the Historical and Archeological Preservation Act,65 the
National Historic Preservation Act,66 the Endangered Species
Act,6 7 the Coastal Zone Management Act, 8 the Marine Protection
Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972,60 and the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act.7 0
The District Engineer must also consider the recommendations of
the regional directors of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the
regional director of the National Marine Fisheries Service of the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the regional
administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the local
representative of the Soil Conservation Service of the Department
of Agriculture and the head of the appropriate state agencies con-
cerned with similar policies. 7'1
and methods to accomplish the object of the proposed structure or
work.(iii) The extent and permanence of the beneficial and/or
detrimental effects that the proposed structure or work may have
on the public and private uses to which the area is suited.(iv) The probable impact of each proposal in relation to the
cumulative effect created by other existing and anticipated struc-
tures or work in the general area.
61. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(f) (3) (i) (1975).
62. 40 C.F.R. § 230 (1975).
63. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-44 (1969).
64. 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-66 (1934).
65. 16 U.S.C. 9 469, et seq. (1964).
66. 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1966).
67. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536 (1973).
68. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456 (1976).
69. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1412-13 (Supp. 1976).
70. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1411 (Supp. 1972). See also, 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(f)
(3) (iii) (1975).
71. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(f) (4) (1975).
S102
[VOL. 3: S86, 1976] Land Use Control
PEPPMDINE LAW REVIEW
If the proposed activity involves wetlands72 (or former wetlands
if the local District Engineer intends to assert the doctrine of
historical navigability),
no permit shall be granted unless the District Engineer
concludes . . that the benefits: of the proposed alteration out-
weigh the damage to the wetlands resource and the proposed alter-
ation is necessary to realize those benefits . . . (a) In evaluating
whether a particular alteration is necessary the District Engineer
shall primarily consider whether the proposed activity is depend-
ent upon the wetland resources and environment and whether
feasible alternative sites are available... (b) The applicant must
provide sufficient data, on the basis of which the availability of
feasible alternative sites can be evaluated. (emphasis added) 7
If the proposed activity involves a canal or other artificial water-
way to be connected to navigable waters, the fact that the appli-
cant has undertaken substantial work to dredge the canal prior to
connecting it to navigable waters "will not be allowed to weigh
favorably in evaluation of the permit application."74
V. REFERRAL TO HIGHER AUTHORITY
When an unresolved objection to the proposed permit by another
federal agency exists7 5 when the recommended decision is contrary
to the stated position of the governor of the affected state or of a
member of Congress, when substantial doubt exists as to authority,
law, regulations, or policies applicable to the proposed activity,
when higher authority requests the case to be forwarded for
decision, when the case is recognized to be highly controversial or
litigation is anticipated, or when the proposed activity would
affect the baseline use for determination of the limits of the terri-
torial sea,76 the matter must be referred by the Division Engineer
to the Chief of Engineers in Washington.
72. "Wetlands are those land and water areas subject to regular inunda-
tion by tidal, riverine, or lacustrine flowage." 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(g) (3)
(1975) (emphasis added).
73. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(g) (3) (iv) (1975) (emphasis added).
The Department of Interior will uniformly object to any permit for a
project in wetlands unless the public interest requires it, no alternative up-
*land site is available and mitigation is provided. See, Review of Fish and
Wildlife Aspects of Proposals in or Affecting Navigable Waters, 40 Fed. Reg.
55811 (December 1, 1975).
74. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(g) (11) (ii) (1975).
75. The EPA of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, principally; see, 33
C.F.R. § 209.120(p) (1) (ii) (1975).
76. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(p) (2) (ii) (A) (1975).
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Since there are no guidelines to govern the disposition of the
matter at the sub-cabinet or cabinet level, the applicant should
consider that his permit is going to be denied.
The breadth of reasons which require the District Engineer to
decline issuance of a permit and refer the matter to the Chief of
Engineers makes it virtually impossible for an applicant to proceed
with a project, regardless of how meritorious or desirable it might
be from a local land use standpoint. If the project's opponents can
make it sufficiently controversial, threaten litigation, or prevail
upon a member of Congress to oppose it a permit will almost cer-
tainly be denied.
If the applicant in frustration be tempted to proceed without a
Corps permit, he should be reminded of the consequences which
could include restoration,7 7 fines up to $25,000 per day, and im-
prisonment for up to one year.7 8
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Is the public interest really served by imposing upon the Corps
water quality, environmental and land use responsibilities which
that agency is not structured to carry out? What particular exper-
tise exists within the Corps to make the evaluations which the
regulations state are necessary and requisite to the issuance of a
permit? What purpose is served by the obvious duplication of
effort to control point source pollution in remote water bodies,
drainage channels and streams in light of the national pollution
discharge elimination system established under FWPCA and ably
administered by the Environmental Protection Agency and the
state certification process? Finally, are not all the questions relat-
ing to the desirability of land fill operations in areas which have
been removed from navigable waters more properly the subject
of state and local policy making?
Congress alone can clarify the situation by amending § 404 of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act along the following lines:
1. Confine Corps jurisdiction to navigable waters currently used,
or subject to use for transporting interstate and foreign commerce;
2. Abolish Corps jurisdiction over land fill operations;
3. Prohibit Corps jurisdiction over navigable waterways identi-
fied as such purely on the basis of historical use alone; and
77. 33 U.S.C. § 406 (1970);Weiszman v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
526 F.2d 1302 (D.D. Cir. 1975).
78. 33 US.C.A. §§ 1311 (a), 1319(c) (Supp. 1976).
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4. Permit the Corps to waive the requirements for oversight
jurisdiction in those instances where the state or a political sub-
division is capable of performing regulatory functions.
On June 3, 1975, S. 1843 (Dole) was introduced in the Senate to
make the foregoing amendments. Since it stands little chance of
passage, the ambiguities created by the current language of the
FWPCA will fall upon the federal courts to resolve. The
judiciary hardly seems to be the proper branch of government to
articulate the policies necessary to bring clarity to this confused
situation.
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